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Our modern society is built up by complex infrastructure systems that need to be able to deal 
with not only their own supporting system, but also to be part of a more complex sophisticat-
ed system where several independent systems are required to work together.  
 
During the last decade security managers and security specialists all over the world have 
started to understand that the complex and sophisticated systems we take for granted on a 
daily basis need to be better protected.  
 
Government and other official authorities have started on a higher and deeper level to assist 
more with the protection of common infrastructure due to the fact that a temporary or in the 
worst case a full stop of the infrastructure will not only affect the economic life, but it will 
also create a fear among the citizens that they are unprotected and not secure.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to gather relevant areas for a fundamental vulnerability assess-
ment that could be the foundation for current and future security managers and specialists 
when they start a vulnerability assessment of their facility. The main sources used for the 
theoretical background comes from ASIS and Sandia.  
 
In the appendix of this thesis the reader can find the suggested vulnerability assessment tem-
plates. The templates should function as guidelines and not as a de facto standard. Depending 
on the investigated facility the reader can choose to adjust the templates to fit their re-
quirements.   
 
The main conclusion of this thesis is that a proper and logical fundamental vulnerability as-
sessment is needed for the management of a specific facility to make the proper security 
changes. 
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Nyky-yhteiskunta on rakennettu monimutkaisten järjestelmien varaan. Näiden järjestelmien 
täytyy toimia sekä itsenäisesti ja ylläpitäen itsenäisiä tukijärjestelmiä, että osana hienora-
kenteista kokonaisvaltaista järjestelmää. 
 
Viimeisten vuosikymmenien aikana turvallisuus päälliköt ja asiantuntijat ovat alkaneet ym-
märtää, että näitä hienovaraisia ja monitahoisia järjestelmiä, joita pidämme yhteiskunnassa 
itsestään selvinä, täytyy suojella ja suojata. 
 
Valtiovalta ja muut viranomaiset ovat ymmärtäneet, kuinka tärkeää on näiden tavallisten yh-
teiskunnan järjestelmien turvaaminen. Näiden järjestelmien väliaikainen tai pahimmassa ta-
pauksessa täydellinen toimintakyvyttömyys, ei vaikuta yhteiskuntaan vain taloudellisesti, 
vaan synnyttää lisäksi turvattomuuden ja epävakaisuuden tunteen kansalaisten keskuudessa. 
 
Tämän opinnäytetyön tarkoituksena on kartoittaa haavoittuvuus arvioinnin keskeisimmät alu-
eet. Opinnäytetyö voi siis toimia nykyisten ja tulevien turvallisuuspäällikköjen ja asiantunti-
joiden perustana uuden hankkeen tai kohteen haavoittuvuuden arvioinnissa. Keskeisimpinä 
lähteinä työssä on käytetty ASIS ja Sandia järjestöjen haavoittuvuus arvioinnin teorioita. 
 
Sisällysluettelosta lukija voi löytää ehdotetut mallit haavoittuvuus arvioinnin tekoon. Mallien 
tulee toimia teoreettisena ohjenuorana arvioinnin tekemiselle. Jokaisen kohteen kohdalla 
lukija arvioi ja mukauttaa mallit sopiviksi kyseisen kohteen yksilöllisten tarpeiden mukaan. 
 
Opinnäytetyön keskeisimpänä johtopäätöksenä voidaan todeta, että haavoittuvuus arvioinnin 
tekeminen on olennaista ja tärkeää, jotta turvattavia kohteita voidaan hallita ja turvata laa-
dukkaasti. 
 
 
 
 
Avainsanat: Haavoittuvuus arviointo, kohde arviointi, uhka analyysi, voimavarojen tiedos-
taminen, haavoittuvuus arvioinnin raportti, riskianalyysi, projekti johtaminen ja tutkimi-
nen.  
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1 Introduction
 
1.1 Background 
 
Security managers around the world have since September 11, 2001 understood that tradi-
tional security that has been applied to the majority of buildings today is far from optimal. 
Traditional security consists of the essential package of installing a CCTV-system, having a 
guard at the front door and making sure that the stereotypical thief does not steal technical 
hardware and/or vandalize the facility in the form of graffiti or littering.  
 
For over a decade, a growing amount of security managers understands that the needs and 
demands from facility stakeholders and human and non-human threats are a vital part of the 
security foundation if we want to establish a decent security level. 
 
Security managers and specialists understand that the management of a facility cannot ap-
prove expensive or for that matter any kind of security solutions unless there is a proven and 
documented reason why it is a necessity, and that it will lead to return on investments.  
 
If a security manager or specialist would like to or ordered to do a vulnerability assessment, 
he can chose from several different methods. Some methods are very complicated and in-
volve detailed financial calculations that will take a vast amount of working hours and might 
not be adequate to their facility or adjusted to the intention of their security.  
 
This thesis goes a little bit deeper and gives the reader and hopefully the security manager a 
more solid foundation to stand on when he or she would like to start a vulnerability assess-
ment project. Depending on the facility and the criticality of it there might and most likely 
will be differences and, as stated before, this thesis serves only as a guideline and not as a de 
facto standard.  
 
1.2 Purpose and structure of this thesis 
 
The primary purpose and target of this thesis is to produce a vulnerability assessment concept 
for future and current security managers.  
 
The primary research question of this thesis is: What essential information should be included 
in a primary vulnerability assessment according to theoretical information used in this thesis? 
 
This thesis is divided into nine different chapters. Through chapters one to seven, the theo-
retical part of the thesis allows the reader to understand the empirical data that needs to be 
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collected for a primary vulnerability assessment and in chapter eight and appendices the 
reader receives practical information on how this empirical data can be gathered and report-
ed.  
 
1.3 Theoretical background 
 
ASIS International was founded in 1955, and it is a security organization devoted to develop-
ing educational programs and materials for security professionals all over the world. The lat-
est information is that ASIS International has over 38,000 members all over the world.  
 
The most central aspects from ASIS that are part of this thesis foundation are the needed in-
formation to be able to take the PSP certification. The PSP certification is the ASIS certifica-
tion to become a certified Physical Security Professional. To be able to achieve the PSP certi-
fication a person needs to study eight publications.  
 
The main book used from ASIS PSP reference material was “Design and Evaluation of Physical 
protection systems, 2nd Ed. The main reasons why this book was the foundation for this thesis 
is due to the comprehensive approach to the subject by the author of the book. Every chapter 
is well written and a clear green thread follows through the whole book. The book is based 
mainly on Sandia reports, legal requirements from American departments such as the de-
partment of labor, regulations published by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the en-
vironmental protection agency, and the United States department of commerce, Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, U.S department of defense, U.S department of justice, and 
department of homeland security. In the appendix, a short summary of the books used from 
ASIS can be found.   
 
The secondary main source for this thesis comes from Sandia National Laboratories. Sandia 
National Laboratories have for over 60 years helped with scientific and technological ad-
vancements regarding security issues for the U.S. Sandia National Laboratories is owned by 
Martin Corporation and has several contracts with the U.S Department of Energy Nuclear Se-
curity Administration. Sandia also cooperates with and supports several federal, state, and 
local government agencies, companies and organizations.   
 
Besides published books/publications from the ASIS PSP reference set and Sandia National 
Laboratories, other publications had an important function in this thesis. The amount of data 
that can be collected for a vulnerability assessment is extensive, and research for this thesis 
was limited to the ASIS PSP reference set and Sandia National Laboratories due to reason that 
their material is commonly used.  A short description of the material can be found in the ap-
pendix. 
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1.4 Methodology and limitations of the thesis 
 
The primary idea of constructive research is to find a new or alternative method to a prob-
lem/situation. The end goal of this thesis is to give the reader an alternative method of how a 
vulnerability assessment can be conducted. According to the constructive research approach 
“the research should solve several related knowledge problems, concerning feasibility, im-
provement and novelty” (Lukka 2003, 83-101). The outcome of this thesis is to produce an 
option regarding vulnerability assessment for the future or current security managers. 
 
Phases of a constructive research plan are according to Hair. Money, Page & Samouel (2007, 
179-222) divided into six different phases. 
 
1. Find a practically relevant problem 
2. Obtain an understanding of the topic and the problem 
3. Innovate, i.e. construct a solution idea 
4. Demonstrate that the solution works 
5. Show theoretical connections and research contributions 
6. Examine the scope of applicability 
 
During this process group discussions, brainstorming with fellow students in the vulnerability 
assessment course at Laurea University of Applied Science, listening to experts from different 
organizations and simple observation was used as a supplementary research to help this thesis 
to be completed. The use of proper theme interviews was considered but not used due to the 
vast differences in knowledge and positions with the interview persons.  
 
This thesis will work as the foundation for two different development projects. The first pro-
ject is the vulnerability assessment course at Laurea University of Applied Sciences, and the 
second development project is a vulnerability assessment report done for a local international 
company. The findings and the process of the vulnerability assessment done for the company 
is confidential and will not be included in this thesis. 
 
This thesis has limitations. The first and most significant limitation of this thesis is that it is 
constructed as a set of guidelines and not as a final product that can be used on all kind of 
facilities all over the world. That means that the reader must understand that each facility 
and placement are individual and should be considered like that during the vulnerability as-
sessment process.  
 
The second limitation of this thesis is that the vulnerability assessment topic is a very dynam-
ic area and/or field of expertise, so one set of guidelines formed in this thesis might be obso-
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lete in the near future due to technical advancements, the way the adversaries are operating, 
legal limitations and so on. 
 
The third imitation of this thesis is that this thesis is primarily influenced on American stand-
ards, American literature and reports created by American governmental bodies and agencies. 
Most of the published material gathered from various agencies within the American govern-
mental bodies only reference themselves or other departments. The primary source of the 
literature or published material is not found, and therefore this should be considered when 
the reader goes through this material. The literature collected for this thesis is primarily 
gathered from books written by American security authors, and therefore the standards or 
requirements needed in Finland or any other European country might differ.  
 
1.5 ISO 31000:2009 
 
This segment describes in short the ISO 31000:2009 and it´s relevance in this vulnerability 
assessment thesis. Another name for the ISO standard 31000:2009 is Risk Management. 
 
According to the ISO.org own website the ISO standard 31000:2009 is a Risk Management 
standard – Principles and guidelines, provides principles, framework and a process for manag-
ing risk.  
 
 
Figure 1 ISO 31000:2009 Risk Management 
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The purpose of ISO 31000:2009 is to standardize, provide principles and guidelines for anyone 
dealing with risk management. If no existent vulnerability assessment process exists the ISO 
standard is qualified tool to start the process.   
 
The Risk Management standard is divided in three sections. The first section is principles for 
managing risk, the second section is framework for managing risk and the last section is about 
the process for managing risk. The general outline and process can be found by searching for 
it on the Internet, but the full version can only be bought or borrowed from libraries that 
have them. The original text that the ISO 31000:2009 is based on is from the AS/NZS 
4360:1995. The ISO standard 31000:2009 can´t according to iso.org be “used for certification 
purposes, but does provide guidance for internal or external audit programs”.   
 
2 Facility characterization 
 
This segment describes the importance of a proper facility characterization in the vulnerabil-
ity assessment. This segment is divided in several chapters and in the end of the thesis in the 
appendix a suggestion of a facility characterization document can be found. The central part 
of the facility characterization is taken from the book, The design and evaluation of physical 
protection systems, second edition (Garcia 2008). 
 
As the first step in a Vulnerability Assessment process, “before any decisions can be made 
concerning the level of protection needed, an understanding of what is being protected and 
the surrounding environment are essential” (Garcia 2008,15). An essential feature of the fa-
cility characterization and the initial step of a vulnerability assessment are to understand the 
priorities of protection and characterization of the facility and its surroundings. (Garcia 
2008,15-23) 
 
According to Garcia (2008), the first and the most important aspect when doing a facility 
characterization is to have an open mind and to use all relevant sources. An up to date audit 
can only be done if working staff, security officers, management and even neighboring com-
panies are addressed and involved in the vulnerability assessment. Obviously their involve-
ment will differ according to their relevance and need of involvement in the assessment. 
This chapter is divided into several sub categories, and it starts with the crucial aspect of de-
termining the level of assessment. When each sub category has been evaluated a proper 
characterization is done.  
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2.1 Determining the level of assessment 
 
Before the assessment starts, the person or group responsible must determine how deep the 
characterization and the whole vulnerability assessment process should go. According to the 
Risk Assessment FEMA 455 there are different factors such as “type of building, location, type 
of construction, number of occupants, economic life, the owners particular concerns and 
available economic resources” (FEMA 455 2009, 6). 
 
The most relevant factor that all vulnerability assessment shares is the benefit versus the cost 
factor.  No one wants to invest a substantial amount of money into a system that in the end 
protects something with little value.  
 
In FEMA 452 and FEMA 455, the level is divided into three different groups or tiers. Tier one is 
the lowest grade security building, and a Tier three building is a high-grade building. 
 
In FEMA 455, a rapid screening table has been made to show a general overview of the work-
load that is necessary for each Tier group. 
 
 
Figure 2 FEMA 455 Rapid screening table 
 
The most significant aspect of this table is to recognize that the Department of Homeland 
Security, which produced this guideline, has their own auditors who fill their requirements 
regarding education, experience and have additional programs with ready-made material that 
can be used from the start.  
 
The second aspect of this table and a good point of direction is that tier one vulnerability as-
sessment should be done for most standard commercial buildings. The tier two is done for 
more high-risk buildings such as government facilities, schools, hospitals and so on. The last 
tier, the tier three is done for high value or critical infrastructure assets. An important part of 
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the vulnerability assessment of the security installations of the facility is to understand what 
kind of building will be analyzed. In general, there are four general components that need to 
be considered before a deeper analysis is started. 
 
In general terms according to FEMA 445, there are three different modes that a building can 
operate under. The first mode is the so-called open mode that means that the facility has no 
security at the entry level so anyone can access without being checked. 
 
The second mode is a closed mode that means that any person who wants to enter the build-
ing needs to pass through some kind of security check (assessment of the security check will 
be explained later on). That means that the person who wants to enter will have his creden-
tials checked, and they need to be on an authorized “list” if they want to continue inside.  
 
The third mode is the hybrid, which means that it is a combination of the first two. It does 
not have to be a security check at the entry level, but some areas of the facility are closed 
and the only way of accessing them is through a security check or some other form of creden-
tials check. 
 
Regarding the operating hours there are three general operating hours a building can follow 
(buildings like military buildings or other high risk buildings are not considered here).  
 
When assessing the opening hours the auditor needs to establish the opening hours of the fa-
cility. There are three common varieties regarding opening hours. Business hours refer to the 
common opening hours of that facility, and follow the requirements of the majority of the 
tenants. The second variety is intermediate hours that mean that the facility is open a couple 
of hours before and after the regular business hours and in some cases on weekends. In gen-
eral, the security department should already be up and running during these pre/post hours. 
A third common option is the “other hours” that means the facility is open during late eve-
nings, nights, early mornings, and weekends. Depending on the facility, the security might be 
needed all hours of the day. 
 
Regarding the facility areas there are four different types of areas that need to be considered 
when doing the vulnerability assessment. The initial analysis is to understand if there are any 
public areas that can be accessed by anyone.  The second area is the rented or assigned area, 
where a tenant has the possibility to rent a specific area for a specified time. The mainte-
nance area is another area that needs to be evaluated and analyzed. The last area is the re-
stricted area where all visitors need to have the right credentials to enter.  
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A Tier one facility according to FEMA 452 is a standard commercial office building. The initial 
step is to review the technical schematics and the site analysis so the investigator can get a 
general overview of the building itself and its environment.  
 
The secondary part of the tier one analysis is to go through the critical core functions and do 
a general vulnerability assessment. The mitigation plans of the building are also written 
down, and everything is logged in the DHS database. Everything is presented to the manage-
ment of the building, and a small portfolio is constructed with recommendations for the man-
agement. The portfolio only targets the general facility, and the security systems and proce-
dures of it.   
 
According to FEMA 452 the most significant factors that the report will be pointing out is how 
the management can prepare themselves for emergency operations, disaster recovery and 
other similar plans and procedures.   
 
A tier two facility according to FEMA 452 is a high-risk building, an iconic building, govern-
mental building, school, hospital, asset for the infrastructure and other similar buildings. The 
tier two analyses are more extensive and cover more areas of the facility. It also involves 
more security professionals. 
 
In addition to the tier one analysis, the tier two team also analyze the structure and building 
envelope of the facility, the mechanical and power systems, the landscape where the facility 
is located and its IT system. The report portfolio will contain the same scope as tier one but 
with additional information regarding costs for mitigation options for blasts, CBR and physical 
security upgrades.  
  
A tier three facility according to FEMA is a  “high value and critical infrastructure” (FEMA 452 
2005, 3-3). It is an in depth analysis with the mindset that explosives and weapons of mass 
destruction will be used against it. The tier three evaluation is the highest level according to 
FEMA, and therefore includes a number of additional sections of importance, such as the ef-
fects of a blast occurrence.   
 
The Ministry of defense "uses KATAKRI (2011) as their primary tool when checking the fulfill-
ment of security requirements” (Ministry of Defense 2013). “The main goal of the National 
Security Auditing Criteria is to harmonize official measures: when an authority conducts an 
audit in a company or in another organization to verify their security level. The second im-
portant goal is to support companies and other organizations as well as authorities with their 
service providers and subcontractors, to work on their own internal security” (Ministry of De-
fense 2013). 
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In practice, they use three levels: base level, increased level and high level.  In standardized 
terms these would be restricted, confidential and secret. The KATAKRI (2011) looks at the 
following four areas: Administrative security, personnel security, physical security and infor-
mation assurance.  
 
The KATAKRI (2011) is built up in the form that the auditor has a book with four main areas 
(mentioned above), and in every area the auditor needs to evaluate the particular statements 
according to KATAKRI (2011) against the level of the organization being audited. 
 
According to Renfroe & Smith (2011) the categorization of a facility can be divided into four 
different categories: 
Category Description 
Very high This is a high profile facility that provides a 
very attractive target for potential adver-
saries, and the level of deterrence and/or 
defense provided by the existing counter-
measures is inadequate 
High This is a high profile regional facility or a 
moderate profile national facility that pro-
vides an attractive target and/or the level of 
deterrence and/or defense provided by the 
existing countermeasures is inadequate 
Moderate This is a moderate profile facility (not well 
known outside the local area or region) that 
provides a potential target and/or the level 
of deterrence and/or defense provided by the 
existing countermeasures is marginally ade-
quate 
Low This is not a high profile facility and provides 
a possible target and/or the level of deter-
rence and/or defense provided by the exist-
ing countermeasures is adequate 
Table 1 Categorization of a facility according to Renfroe & Smith (2011) 
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2.2 Physical condition 
 
When the Vulnerability Assessment team has chosen the level of analysis they want to con-
duct the first item on the list is to investigate the physical condition of the facility. The phys-
ical condition of the facility can be divided into six different areas according to FEMA 455 out-
line and "The design and evaluation of physical protection systems". 
 
The first category is about the country and the placement of the facility. The initial step in 
the physical condition is to make sure that the vulnerability assessment team understands 
that every region is different. The political climate, local inhabitants and neighboring compa-
nies/residents can and will play an important role of the assessment. 
 
Second category in the vulnerability assessment is to look at the topography and the sur-
roundings. The topography aspect is very interesting the further away the facility is located 
from neutral land or familiar areas. By placing, constructing or even rearranging the assets 
inside the facility, the surrounding area can either act as an asset to the facility or as a weak 
spot. 
 
The surrounding aspect is more focused on the aspect of what kind of other important facili-
ties or areas exists in the nearby surroundings.  According to FEMA 455, the surrounding area 
is divided into three different areas: Zone 1 is 30m and less from the building, Zone 2 is 30-
90m from the building, and Zone 3 is 90-300m from the building. The different zones play an 
important role depending on how far the vulnerability assessment team wants to conduct 
their analysis and the need for it. In some regions and for some facilities this kind of depth is 
unnecessary, but for others it can play an important factor if the company wants to place 
their facility there.  
 
The last general zone that plays an important role, and that needs to be evaluated, is if other 
high value targets or communication hubs exist in the region. If a nuclear plant or an airport 
exists in the area it can affect the vulnerability assessment for the facility. Again the type of 
the facility and the depth of the analysis play an important role. 
 
When the investigation of the surroundings of the facility is done, the next step is to analyze 
the facility itself. The initial step is making sure that the vulnerability assessment team has 
updated blueprints in their possession and, if possible, an extra set of copies that the vulner-
ability assessment team can make notes on. In general, the blueprints should contain infor-
mation regarding the electrical system, plumbing system, ventilation system, phone and In-
ternet cables, etc.  
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Schematics of the facility are also necessary because on them are the different areas such as 
placement of CCTV-cameras, panic buttons, alarm sensors, fire extinguishers, doors, emer-
gency doors, windows etc.  A separate schematic should be done for the hazardous areas, 
vital environmental areas, vital assets, etc.  
 
The fourth category for the Vulnerability assessment team to analyze is the security installa-
tions in the facility. The vulnerability assessment team needs to look at the current security 
system installed if any exist. The general physical protection system is divided into four parts.  
 
The first part is the detection, which means that the system needs to discover the intrusion, 
communicate the alarm to a controller and give the controller enough information so he can 
assess it. This part is often referred to as the outer layer of security.   
 
The second part is a delay, which means that the system needs to be able to delay the adver-
sary by having barriers and different layers of security so the adversary will be delayed. 
  
The third part is the response, which means that a security force, internal or external, re-
sponds to the detected intrusion. This part is often referred to as the middle layer of securi-
ty.  This section belongs to the delay section, but it is not on the envelope of the building, 
but inside. It is referred to as the inner layer of security and depending on the type of build-
ing there might be several inner security layers.  
 
The fourth part, which is a topic that the most modern books start to cover, is the neutraliza-
tion part. The neutralization part does not mean that the security force will eliminate the 
adversary but rather that the security officer responding to the adversary has enough tools, 
knowledge and legal rights to respond and deal with the situation. It is important that the 
neutralization part is according to the legal requirements and demands, otherwise the conse-
quences of the actions undertaken by the security guards and/or the security system can be 
worse then calculated.  
 
The fifth category that the vulnerability assessment team needs to analyze is the exterior 
intrusion system. The main focus of the exterior intrusion system is to detect and, if possible, 
delay any intrusion attempts. The vulnerability assessment team needs to look at how the 
current exterior intrusion system works. There are different methods of analyzing the exteri-
or intrusion systems and one simple method is mentioned below.  
 
According to Garcia, “the probability of detection depends primarily on target to be detect-
ed, sensor hardware design, installation conditions, sensitivity adjustment, weather condi-
tion, condition of the equipment and acceptable nuisance alarm rate” (2008, 70). 
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Testing of the different systems should be done during different phases of the day and it 
should be done minimum ten times to ensure that the data collected is enough to give a clear 
picture of if the system works or not. 
 
The vulnerability assessment team analyzes the exterior physical security system based on 
the factors mentioned above. The exterior physical security system should be working accord-
ing to the different zones, country and placements of the facility, legal regulations, goals and 
objectives of the company housed in the facility, the assets it protects and according to the 
budget that the security department has.  
 
The sixth category that the vulnerability assessment team needs to analyze is the interior in-
trusion system. The interior intrusion system works under different conditions. The vulnera-
bility assessment team constructs their analysis on the same criteria as for the exterior intru-
sion system, but the central focus is on how the interior intrusion or detection system works 
for the security department in regards of detection and assessment.  
 
If the intrusion system is constructed so that an alarm will go off when anyone is moving in-
side the building during daily operations, the nuisance alarms will be too high and most likely 
often ignored by the alarm operator. The vulnerability assessment team analyzes how the 
security officers assess each alarm, their response and communication to other security offic-
ers and the entry control itself.  
  
2.3 Facility operations 
 
The exterior is now completed, and the vulnerability assessment team moves forward and 
start working with the interior. The interior can be divided into the daily operation of the 
facility, non-daily operation of the facility, emergency operations, security operations and 
procedures. 
 
The daily operation of the facility is usually going on between 09:00 and 18:00. During this 
time, most of the staff, visitors, guests, etc. are in the facility. That means that the vulnera-
bility assessment team needs to look at, for example, how the staff arrives to the facility, 
behaves in the facility and how they leave the facility.  
 
The non-daily operation is the time before the facility is open or when the facility is closed 
from the general employees, visitors, guests, etc. Most facilities today use a night cleaning 
crew to deal with the cleaning, and the vulnerability assessment team needs to analyze how 
they behave, work and operate during these hours.  
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Depending on the facility they might have their own security, hired security, or external secu-
rity that arrives in case of an emergency. How the security is incorporated in the facility and 
trained with the local staff can and will play an important role in case something happens. 
The most significant factor here is that the vulnerability assessment team looks at how the 
staff works during an exercise compared to a plan, if any exists. 
 
The most significant part of the auditing is to analyze how the security manages the building 
in the sense of opening, running and closing it. It is also important for the vulnerability as-
sessment team to analyze if the security reports are delivered to the facility stakeholders or 
stopped in the middle.  
 
The vulnerability team that conducts the analysis will depend on the structure of the facility 
security has reports of logged incidents. These reports will be the foundation for the vulnera-
bility assessment team when they investigate how the security, staff, employees and others 
conducted themselves/behaved during an incident. The reports should be at the disposal of 
the vulnerability assessment team so they can analyze them and interview the necessary per-
sons to gain an overview of how the emergency situations works in a real situation. 
 
Depending on the facility and its function there might be "what if" plans/recommendations. 
These plans need to be checked to verify they are up to date and practiced with the relevant 
staff. In general terms, this plan is called a business continuity plan, but this vulnerability 
assessment analysis is only done for the security part of the facility and not for the business 
side or other aspects.  
 
2.4 Facility policies and procedures 
 
A facility can have written and unwritten policies and procedures. The management of the 
facility or sometimes the particular manager for their individual department in general, sets 
the policies of a facility. All procedures need to be approved by the highest management and 
in some cases even approved by the legal department.  
 
The procedures are based on the policies that the management has approved. The procedures 
can be constructed very strictly or as guidelines. The structure of the procedures depends on 
the facility and legal requirements  
 
The policies and procedures of the facility should be available for all relevant personnel if 
they are directly connected to that specific area. There is no need for having a security of-
ficer reading about the legal procedures of trading with a foreign country if they do not take 
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any part in the process or interact at any point with the trade. Relevant information to rele-
vant people is the key phrase.  
 
Even though the goals are always the same the difference between the educated and opera-
tional set of procedures can be extensive. The operational could be a more efficient method 
of achieving the same goal, but the risks that come with it could be greater. Therefore the 
vulnerability assessment team should be guided around the facility by experienced and trust-
ed staff, but they should also have the possibility to observe how for example security offic-
ers work on a day-to-day basis.  
 
2.5 Legal aspect 
 
Upon entering the legal aspect of the facility it does not matter what the function of the fa-
cility is. The important aspect here is to find out if there are any legal aspects that need to 
be followed.  
 
The legal aspect of a facility could be a very crucial part of how the security is structured and 
why some procedures are the way they are. A professional should approve the legal aspects of 
the facility. If something happens and it comes out that the management and stakeholders 
did not follow the regulations, the company might not only go bankrupt but also be liable for 
the consequences of their actions.   
 
2.6 Safety consideration 
 
Security needs and safety needs might not always go hand in hand. From the security manager 
point of view, security comes first, and the assets need to be protected at all times. From the 
human resource manager side, the most valuable assets are the employees and they should be 
protected at all times. Even though we are all humans we sometimes forget that even humans 
can and will continuously do mistakes.  
 
The security manager should cooperate with the human resource manager to construct differ-
ent safeguards that work both ways. It can be something as easy as locking the computer be-
fore leaving it. 
 
2.7 Corporate goals and objectives 
 
Every organization that is housed in a facility has their goals and objectives. They do not have 
to aim at earning money, but they do exist. For the security department, it is necessary to 
understand the goals and objectives of the organization.  
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By understanding the goals and objectives of the organization the security department can 
integrate their procedures with the people, procedures and equipment of the facility. That 
will lead to a mutual understanding of the security needs and the company will see the bene-
fits of having a well working security department.  
 
The vulnerability assessment team needs to look at the goals and objectives of the organiza-
tion in the facility and see how that is incorporated into the procedures of the security staff 
of the facility. 
 
3 Asset Identification 
 
This segment describes the importance of proper asset identification in the vulnerability as-
sessment. This segment is divided in several chapters and in the end of the thesis in the ap-
pendix a suggestion of asset identification document can be found. There are multiple options 
when a asset identification is done and in this segment the asset identification process is put 
together from several different methods. The methods are gathered from ASIS, FEMA 452 & 
455 and Strategic Security Management, A risk assessment guide for decision makers (Vellani 
2007). 
 
In general terms, an asset is a resource of value, requiring protection.  The asset itself has a 
value, belongs to the business function and could be difficult to replace within a required 
timeline. The most significant part regarding the asset identification for the VA team and the 
facility management is to value the assets and put everything in perspective and prioritize. 
Some assets might at first glance seem valuable but in the end are not.  
 
The VA team analyzes five different areas when it comes to assets. The three main categories 
that the vulnerability assessment looks at are how critical the asset is to the business opera-
tions, the replacement value and value of the asset itself. The value of the asset is sometimes 
not measured in money, but in lives. Proper insurance can cover most of the costs, but loos-
ing life is something that is not repairable.  
 
3.1 Category one – People 
 
According to Vellani (2007), the first category is the people that are inside or adjacent to the 
facility. When the vulnerability assessment team analyzes the people category, it contains 
the staff during working hours and outside working hours, visitors, visiting contractors or simi-
lar, any kind of guests, tourists and so on.  
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3.2 Category two – Property 
 
According to Vellani (2007), the second category the vulnerability assessment team analyzes 
is the property the facility owns or consists of. The design of the facility can attract bad in-
tentions from adversaries in the form of graffiti or destruction of the exterior/interior facili-
ty. Graffiti, vandalism, destruction of property, etc. are likely not a critical part of the busi-
ness, but the visual damage can be destructive enough. 
 
3.3 Category three – Information 
 
According to Vellani (2007), the third category that the vulnerability assessment team analyz-
es is the information that the company handles. As mentioned earlier, both the FEMA 452/455 
and KATAKRI (2011) divide the information into three subcategories, depending on their rele-
vance for the company.  The categories can be open information, confidential information 
and restricted information. In KATAKRI (2011), the division is into base level, increased level 
and high level. Each category has different guidelines. 
 
3.4 Category four – Critical Assets 
 
According to Vellani (2007), the fourth category that the vulnerability assessment team ana-
lyzes is the critical assets. The critical assets are different in every facility. In some organiza-
tions the people are the most critical assets, but in others, like a gas plant, the safeguards of 
the plants are critical assets and they need to be regularly monitored, otherwise the conse-
quences can be extremely high.  
 
3.5 Intangible assets 
 
According to Vellani (2007) there are three principal intangible components regarding assets 
that the vulnerability assessment team needs to take into consideration during the assess-
ment.   
 
Depending on the position of the head of security he or she needs to assess every routine, 
procedure and policy that his or her security guards follows. Different levels of security and 
different methods of approaching different types of problems will affect the reputation of the 
security of the company. The bad reputation of the security of the company will affect not 
only the security guards, but also the trust of internal and external colleagues. 
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The second area of intangible assets that needs to be evaluated belongs more to the business 
side and less to the security side. It does not mean that they will not affect each other, but 
the creditworthiness of the company does not on a regular basis belong to the security side. 
 
 Regarding the viewpoint of relationships to other companies, the security department can 
play an important role. The security manager and his/her security officers can create a 
friendly atmosphere in the area by being friendly, giving a helping hand and supporting in the 
ways they can without compromising the security of the facility or themselves. The relation-
ships to other companies are always important. 
 
By creating a goodhearted relationship with the immediate nearby companies, the security 
officers might receive information about a potential threat before they even spot them by 
themselves.  
 
3.6 Scale of measuring the relevance of the assets 
 
In his book, Vellani (2007, 20) mentions a four level relative scale for measuring the relevance 
of the assets. 
 
Category Description 
Low A manageable impact to business operations 
and no likelihood of mission failure 
Medium Moderate operational impact that may only 
affect a portion of the business processes and 
for a short period of time 
High Serious unwanted impact that may impair 
normal operations in their entirety or com-
plete loss of a portion of operations for an 
extended time period 
Critical Asset that, if lost, damaged, or destroyed, 
can result in mission failure 
Table 2 Relative scale for measuring the relevance according to Vellani (2007) 
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Another method for valuing the assets is by using a cost formula, as suggested by ASIS: 
K= (Cp + Ct + Cr +Ci) -I 
K = Total cost of loss 
Cp = Cost of permanent substitute 
Ct = Cost of temporary substitute 
Cr = Total related costs (removal of the old asset, installing new, etc.) 
Ci = Lost income cost 
-I = Available indemnity or insurance 
 
3.7 Asset identification in aspects of an adversary 
 
The VA team needs to include the method of thinking of different terrorist groups in the Asset 
identification. The symbolic value of a building, organization or assets inside the facility may 
play such an important role in the Asset identification that everything else is ruled out. 
 
The vulnerability assessment team needs to analyze the organization, and rank according to 
the suggested scale above each asset that exists in the company. In the next chapter “Threat 
Assessment” the threat against the organization will be analyzed, and a clearer picture re-
garding the connection between the threat and the asset is given. 
 
4 Threat Assessment 
 
This segment describes the importance of proper threat assessment in the vulnerability as-
sessment. This segment is divided in several chapters and in the end of the thesis in the ap-
pendix a suggestion of threat assessment document can be found. Several options exist and in 
the appendix a suggested document can be used as a reference template. The main ideas are 
taken from FEMA 452 & 455, ASIS and the books written by the authors Vellani, Bringer et al 
and Garcia. 
 
The threat assessment team needs to overlook the full range of adversaries that could affect 
the given facility. Authors such as Vellani (2007) and Garcia (2008) generalize the adversaries 
in three main groups.  
 
The threats can be insiders, outsiders and outsiders working together with insiders. After the-
se three broad groups, we have natural disasters and accidents. Basically, the threats are di-
vided into human and non-human related threats.  
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The threat analysis is divided into the following areas: gathering information on potential 
threats, analyzing the different adversaries, their capabilities, finding the general interest of 
the adversary and the assets of the facility (likelihood) and creating an overview. 
 
4.1 Gathering information on existing and potential threats 
 
The initial step in the threat analysis is to gather as much information as possible from differ-
ent sources. The vulnerability assessment team needs to divide the sources according to the 
capabilities of its members, but also according to the individual connection that every person 
might have  
 
As an example, the Vulnerability assessment team can distinguish the human threats in the 
following categories: Terrorists (international, domestic), Criminals, Extremists, Vandals, 
Foreign intelligence personnel, Psychotics, Industrial Espionage, and Insiders. 
 
The amount of terrorist groups that exist in the world is huge, but luckily the different groups 
can be in general divided into regions, aims and goals, relevance and more.  
A terrorist group is driven by political, ideological and issue-oriented reasons. The vulnerabil-
ity assessment team does not need to investigate how different cells in different groups func-
tion, but they need to understand that the terrorist groups (in general) work in small teams, 
are well trained, highly skilled, sophisticated and not afraid of using heavy weapons and cre-
ating casualties and devastation.  
 
The vulnerability assessment team needs to look at the given facility because the varieties of 
terrorist groups are vast. Terrorist groups can come in many forms such as ecological groups, 
white supremacists groups, environmental groups, animal activists groups etc. In YLE News 
(2012), Antti Pelttari of the Finnish National Security Intelligence Service said, “the amount 
of people linked to terrorist groups in Finland has multiplied in the last decade”. 
 
When the Vulnerability assessment team investigates the criminal category they can use offi-
cial sources (see below). Criminals in general are driven by profit or economic gain, and visi-
ble assets are the ones in the danger zone.  
 
Extremism in the European region is growing, and until the last couple of years they have 
mainly been involved in fighting, protesting, demonstrating, and writing articles/hate blogs, 
but after the attack in Norway by Anders Breivik, the general idea about the danger extrem-
ists pose has radically changed. Information regarding extremists can be found by using intel-
ligence sources, different scholarly papers and books.  
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In general terms, vandals do not pose any sophisticated or large threat to a company. The 
intentions of the vandals are usually to vandalize, spray graffiti and create a mess in the area 
of their location. 
  
The vulnerability assessment team started with the facility characterization, and during this 
stage the need for investigating the threat from foreign intelligence personnel will clearly 
evolve. A typical facility that encounters foreign intelligence personnel is technological com-
panies. 
 
In the book Security Risk Assessment and Management (Biringer, Matalucci & O´Connor 2007, 
55) define an insider as “anyone with knowledge of operation or security systems and who has 
unescorted access to facilities or security interests” (2007, 55). An insider can be passive 
(provide information), active non-violent (shutting off alarm system, CCTV etc.) or active vio-
lent (fighting, shooting, destroying etc.).  
 
4.2 Intelligence sources 
 
The most reliable sources that exist are the reports made by the local authorities. The re-
ports are official documents and can be ordered from the police or other law agencies.  
 
The second intelligence source is companies around the facility. By investigating the nearby 
surroundings, the vulnerability assessment team can, if possible, create a new network con-
sisting of security managers from neighboring companies where information can be shared. 
 
The thirds intelligence source is different organizations and companies. There are numerous 
companies that can provide the information needed. There are also organizations such as ASIS 
that provide the possibility for security managers to meet and share information and solu-
tions.   
 
4.3 Crime analysis 
 
There are different non-profit organizations, schools, universities, departments, etc. that 
conduct crime analysis on a local and national scale. By working together or at least by going 
through their information, the vulnerability assessment team can create a general picture of 
the current and historic crime situation.  
 
If the facility is a more attractive place for adversaries the vulnerability assessment team can 
study international studies or reports from international organizations to see how similar 
buildings in other countries in the nearby area and further have been affected. Common 
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crimes are usually not evaluated in the threat spectrum so therefore it should have its own 
analysis based on statistics done by the authorities.  
 
4.4 Published literature 
 
Libraries, professors, students, newspapers, private persons and more can be a useful source 
of information. Studies or reports by local and national newspapers and universities can be 
very helpful if other official documents do not exist or there is a lack of them.  
 
The vulnerability assessment team can also look at the local library if any up to date books 
exist about the threats concerning their facility.  
 
4.5 Government directives and legislation 
 
Depending on the facility, the vulnerability assessment team analysis might have to take into 
account some legal directives and legislation that need to be obeyed. This is already men-
tioned in the facility categorization as an important factor in understanding how the building 
operates and why some procedures need to be done in a specific order or with a specific 
method. 
 
4.6 Capabilities of the adversary 
 
When the vulnerability assessment team has gathered all the information mentioned above, 
they are obligated to understand the capabilities of each adversary category that exists. It is 
significant that the Vulnerability assessment team analyze each adversary thoroughly because 
the findings of the analysis will lay the foundation of the amendments to the current physical 
protection system.  
 
According to Biringer et al. (2007), the capabilities of the adversaries can be divided into ten 
different categories. 
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Category Short description 
Motivation The motivation level of the adversaries differs 
and therefore the scoring of this category 
should be accordingly. 
Tactics/Method Different threats use different tac-
tics/method to achieve their goal and objec-
tives. 
Intelligence Gathering Depending on the goals and objectives of the 
threat the level of information gathered for 
the event differs. 
Level of interest Different facilities give different level of in-
terest from the adversary.  
Equipment of the adversary Depending on the adversary the access to a 
different type of equipment can vary from 
basic tools to sophisticated military grade 
equipment.  
Transportation Depending on the categories mentioned above 
the transportation needs is something that 
needs to be thought of.  
Weapons/Explosives Depending on the threat and their goals and 
objectives the use of weapons and explosives 
is something that should fall in a different 
category due to the implications it can create 
Level of knowledge Depending on the desired outcome the level 
of knowledge from the adversary differ. 
Financial support Depending on the categories mentioned above 
the financial support for the adversary could 
play and important role 
Collusion with an insider Depending on the goal and objective of the 
adversary the help of an insider could mean 
the difference between success or failure.  
Table 3 Categories of capabilities (Biringer et al. 2007, 56-57) 
 
In general terms, the motives are based on the goals and objectives of the adversary. The 
motives can be based on financial gain, ideology, personal reasons, hostility, revenge, psy-
chosis (mental illness) etc. Some adversaries might conduct an illegal act against a facility to 
create a statement due to its connection to their cause, and of course terrorists might con-
duct acts to create terror, mass casualties, economic disaster etc.  
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Each threat against the facility can use different tactics to achieve their goals. A heroin ad-
dict that breaks in to steal a forgotten wallet is completely different from a rival company 
that wants to steal the company secrets. The methods need to support the motivation that is 
based on the goals and objectives of the adversary.  
 
When the intelligence gathering means are discussed, they depend on the sophistication of 
the tactics and motivation regarding the different levels of information needs of the adver-
sary. As mentioned above, the addict that passes by the facility will use a more direct and 
quick tactic to attain his goal while the information thief from the rivaling company needs to 
analyze and invest more time in the attack. The same way of thinking is applied to each 
threat depending on their tactics, motivation, and goals and objectives.  
 
The target of interest is also something the vulnerability assessment team will need to ana-
lyze due to the fact that different assets attract different threats. By defining the different 
threats and their interests, the vulnerability assessment team can understand and make a 
better analysis of the facility and how the adversary will think.  Depending on the interest of 
the adversary, their goals and objectives, their motivation, the target, and their intelligence 
information, the adversaries will either work alone, in small groups or even in cells. Each 
threat acts differently, and it should be taken into consideration by the vulnerability assess-
ment team.  
 
The next step for the vulnerability assessment team is to look at the most common equipment 
the different threats are using. By going through the steps above the vulnerability assessment 
team can quickly, based on past incidents, similar incidents and common sense, start to un-
derstand what kind of equipment the threat will use against the facility. By analyzing the 
equipment needed the vulnerability assessment team can start to see if any soft spots exist. 
 
Different threats use a different type of transportation to the targeted facility. The person 
who wants to break in and steal something small might walk but the adversaries that would 
like to do a smash and grab need to use a minimum two cars to conduct their attack. 
 
Another important factor concerning the adversaries and their equipment is if they are using 
any kind of weapons. Crime analysis and trends in the particular area, region, country, laws 
and regulations, past incidents, and similar incidents need to be analyzed so the vulnerability 
assessment team can have a better understanding of any forms of weapons that might be 
used and how they are used.  Each adversary will act differently and his or her skills and 
knowledge vary. The person who wants to break in through a window needs fewer skills com-
pared to a person who would like to steal company secrets or conduct a terror attack.  
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Some crimes need financial support while others demand more resources, and more resources 
means greater possibility to get caught. Depending on the threat and the factors mentioned 
above there is always a possibility that the adversary will conduct his act together with an 
insider. The central problem with an insider is that he or she has access to the assets in most 
cases without being checked.  
 
4.7 Example of threat capability spectrum 
 
When a threat capability spectrum is constructed the auditor should consider the following 
areas: information about the adversary, history of the adversary and attractiveness of the 
target in the eyes of the adversary. Each category is filled with subcategories and a general 
threat capability spectrum of each subcategory can be found at the end of the appendix.  
 
In general terms the information category contains subcategories regarding the needed in-
formation about the adversary under investigation. The history of the adversary is information 
needed to understand the past activities of a specific adversary in the aspect of a specific 
facility. The last category is the attractiveness of the facility for the adversary. By under-
standing how interested an adversary is of the protected building, the auditor will understand 
to what kind of extent will the adversary go to achieve his goals.  
 
4.8 Calculate the threat spectrum and evaluate the risks 
 
The threat spectrum above is an example constructed by using threat spectrum tables from 
FEMA 452, FEMA 455, and the works of Vellani (2007), Garcia (2008), and Biringer et al. 
(2007). The purpose is to give a hint of what kind of threat levels different threats possess 
against a given facility. The lists above do not work unless the Vulnerability assessment team 
creates a list of potential threats that the given facility can encounter.  
 
According to TRA-1 (Communications security establishment Canada C-2 2011) a threat spec-
trum can consist of the three main categories: deliberate, accidents and natural hazards. The 
three categories consist of in total 260 threats that need to be categorized and analyzed.  
 
Some facilities have more sophisticated threats and others have less sophisticated where a 
shorter analysis can be done to conclude the threat analysis. To be able to do a proper threat 
spectrum, a crime analysis needs to be done. The police usually do the crime analysis, and 
statistics are published for the general audience (International statistics on Crime and Justice 
2010).  
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The given value can be transformed into numbers, and it can be further developed if the Vul-
nerability assessment team thinks it is needed. For this thesis, the different values H, M, L 
are given the values 3x.2x.1x. That means that the highest value regarding the information 
about the adversary can be 14*3 = 42p. The highest value regarding the attractiveness of the 
adversary can be 3*3=9p. So by drawing a simple X/Y (information/attractiveness) chart the 
values and threats will be more tangible and comparable.  
 
The federal security risk management uses the following model to determine the risk level for 
each threat 
 
Figure 3 Threat/vulnerability assessments and risk analysis risk rating  
 
According to Renfroe & Smith (2011) the different impacts of loss levels are defined as: 
 
Devastating: The facility is damaged/contaminated beyond habitable use. Most items are lost, 
destroyed, or damaged beyond repair/restoration. The number of visitors to other facilities in 
the organization may be reduced by up to 75% for a limited period of time. 
  
Severe: The facility is partially damaged/contaminated. Examples include partial structure 
breach resulting in weather/water, smoke, impact, or fire damage to some areas. Some 
items/assets in the facility are damaged beyond repair, but the facility remains mostly intact. 
The entire facility may be closed for a period of up to two weeks, and a portion of the facility 
may be closed for an extended period of time (more than one month). Some assets may need 
to be moved to remote locations to protect them from environmental damage. The number of 
 32 
visitors to the facility and others in the organization may be reduced by up to 50% of a limited 
period of time.  
 
Noticeable:  The facility is temporarily closed or unable to operate, but can continue without 
an interruption of more than one day. A limited number of assets may be damaged, but the 
majority of the facility is not affected. The number of visitors to the facility and others in the 
organization may be reduced by up to 25% for a limited period of time.  
 
Minor: The facility experiences no significant impact on operations (downtime is less than 
four hours) and there is no loss of major assets (Renfroe & Smith 2011) 
 
5 Auditing 
 
This segment describes the importance of proper auditing in the vulnerability assessment and 
in the end of the thesis in the appendix a suggestion of auditing document can be found. The 
auditing process itself varies extensively depending on the targeted facility but the central 
part of the auditing chapter is taken from the author Broders who wrote Risk Analysis and the 
security survey. 4nd Ed. 
 
The security audit that the Vulnerability assessment team conducts will evaluate how the se-
curity system performs against a set of criteria set previously. The central criteria should be 
based on the threat assessment done earlier and on the crime analysis. 
 
The auditing needs to follow a logical order and in a vulnerability assessment for security in-
stallations it should be done from the outside in. It follows the principle of detect, delay and, 
in some cases, neutralize.  
 
“Purpose of the Survey: To identify critical factors affecting the security of the premises or 
operation. To analyze vulnerabilities and recommend cost effective solutions” (Broder 2012, 
55). 
 
The auditing is based on the principles of detect and delay (the delay part is at this moment 
an estimation). The assessment and every section of it that undergoes auditing will be divided 
into these principles and evaluated. The most significant aspects to remember during the au-
diting are the timeframe at hand, purpose, and the type of facility, threats against the facili-
ty, level of knowledge from the auditor and if it is a quantitative or qualitative assessment.  
 
The assessment and auditing in this thesis are based on the qualitative assessment because 
the time to evaluate a specific building is usually limited. Other positive benefits from a qual-
 33 
itative assessment are the ability to use manpower with lower knowledge of security and 
achieving the goals with satisfactory results. To be able to comprehend the audit use L, M, 
and H (Low, Medium and High) in aspects of how secure the specific object is.  
 
In general terms, the audit can be divided into different groups, and each group requires spe-
cific evaluation information beforehand. The evaluation information needs to be based on the 
legal requirements, the need for protection, internal and external requirements, if they exist 
(for example ISO standards). The following subgroups need to be evaluated: perimeter area, 
exterior doors, exterior windows, other exterior entry points, security checks (gate, door, 
exterior, interior, exterior lighting, keys, safes (backups) etc.  
 
The first part of the audit is to evaluate the perimeter, its existence, and its ability to detect 
an intruder. Not all facilities have a perimeter defense such as a fence, walls, natural ele-
ments such as rivers, mountains, or a clear line of sight (military posts and prisons) etc. 
Therefore for most facilities the perimeter is the shell of the building (walls, emergency ex-
ists, windows, etc.) Some examples will be used to show how the audit should be conducted 
and what kind of information is needed to understand the level of security and how to per-
form a basic audit.  
 
Type L M H N/A Comment 
Perimeter Fence      
L = Lack of fence      
M = Fence exists, but 
only partial of the area 
is sealed off 
     
H = Fence exists, and 
provide security 
against for example an 
intruder 
     
Type of fence?      
Type of locking mecha-
nism? 
     
Clear area on both 
sides of the fence? 
     
Estimated time to 
penetrate? 
     
Vulnerable according 
to threat assessment? 
     
Perimeter lightning      
L = Lack of lighting      
M = Partial lighting of 
the perimeter area 
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H = Perimeter lighting 
exists and covers all 
the surrounding areas  
     
Is the lightning working 
with other means of 
security? 
     
Is the lightning con-
stant or by movement? 
     
Estimated time of 
effectiveness? 
     
Vulnerable according 
to threat assessment? 
     
Table 4 Basic audit template 
 
6 Red Teaming 
 
This segment describes the importance of proper red teaming in the vulnerability assessment. 
The central parts of the red teaming segment is gathered from the  Red Teaming guide ( UK 
Ministry of Defense 2013) and The information design Assurance Red Team (Sandia 2009).  
 
According to the UK Ministry of Defense (2013, 1-1),“Red Teams and Red teaming processes 
have long been used as tools by the management of both government and commercial enter-
prises. Their purpose is to reduce an enterprise risk and increase its opportunities…Red Teams 
are established by an enterprise to challenge aspects of that very enterprise´s plans, pro-
grams, assumptions, etc.” 
 
Red teams within IT Security often consist of so called “white hats” that have not only the 
legal authorization to conduct the checks, but they report their findings back so the targeted 
company can use the information and improve their security.  
 
According to Sandia (2009b), red teaming is defined as “authorized, adversary-based assess-
ment for defensive purposes.”. The management of the target facility authorizes the assess-
ment and the idea is to conduct different exercises so the security can be evaluated.  
 
According to UK Ministry of defense (2013) the objective of the red team can be categorized 
into three different categories. The first category is the Diagnostic phase, the second catego-
ry is the Creative phase and the last phase is the Challenge phase.  
 
For the vulnerability assessment team, the most relevant phase would be the Challenge phase 
where the red team can analyze the security installations by acting as the adversary within a 
particular framework. Before acting as the adversary it is necessary to create a general pro-
 35 
gram regarding the red team. According to Sandia (2009b) the red team program should be 
divided into four phases.  
 
Phase one is to understand the need of a red team in a vulnerability assessment analysis. To 
use a red team without understanding the purpose of the red team is only creating more work 
for the assessment. The red team needs to understand what we want to achieve and work 
accordingly.  
 
The second phase is to determine what the red team needs to do. Is it a penetration attempt, 
acting as different adversaries and verifying the security, checking the information quality, 
analyzing the equipment and needs, or other goals? Some needs might require that the red 
team have access to all the material, and in other cases the red team needs to work sepa-
rately as a stand-alone unit. 
 
The third phase is to determine the people that should be part of the red team. Depending on 
the needs and the goals, of members of the red team can and should differ. In some cases, 
the members need to have more experience in the security field and in other cases it can be 
more on an academic level. 
 
The fourth phase is how the outcome of the red team will be used in the vulnerability assess-
ment. The findings of the red team can be, depending on the level of the red team, down to 
the fundamental structure or only focusing on the central points. Depending on the need and 
the goal (phase one and two) of the red team, the report and outcome of the red team should 
be structured up before the operation is started. 
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Figure 4 Sandia Red Team Process (2009a) 
 
When a vulnerability assessment team takes the decision to use a red team, the following 
guidelines (example) should be used so the risk of safety and security issues is limited.  
  
Area To think about 
Authorities ! Make sure the proper authorities (& security compa-
nies) are aware of the audit so no emergency situa-
tion will occur 
! If needed, place a police car in the area so in case 
of emergency during the audit 
! Make sure that the alarm system is put in testing 
mode (should still give signals) 
The company ! Make sure that a contact person at the company is 
aware of the audit and what sys-
tems/department/area is audited 
! A letter signed by someone in the audited company 
should be drafted and worn by the red team person 
in case he needs to identify himself 
Use of force ! No force or act of force is allowed to be used 
against security staff, or other workers 
! In case off force is used, the audit should immedi-
ately stop and identification (letter) should be 
shown 
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Items ! Every suspicious item that is brought into the facility 
should be clearly informed to the supervisor so it 
will not be forgotten after the test 
! Every suspicious item that is brought into the facility 
should be clearly marked as a dummy so no one will 
call the emergency units or start emergency proce-
dures 
 
Rules for the red team 
members 
! Safety is priority number one, and in case a red 
team member foresees a potential threat to their 
safety or the people involved in the exercise, the 
red team member should immediately stop the au-
dit. 
! A red team member is not allowed to change the 
audit without consulting the leader of the audit.  
 
Table 5 Basic topics to be considered before a red teaming exercise 
 
7 Vulnerability Assessment Report 
 
This segment describes the importance of the vulnerability assessment report done from the 
vulnerability assessment. A general template for a vulnerability assessment report can be 
found in the appendix. 
 
The vulnerability assessment report that will be presented to the management for further 
analysis and decisions on how to proceed can follow this structure. There are several tem-
plates on the Internet that could be used when writing the security assessment report. A good 
example is a template written by Watson (Watson 2005).  
 
There are several different methods of writing a vulnerability assessment report, and accord-
ing to the findings of this thesis, the best method is to keep it short, based on facts, and di-
rect to the point. The report itself will be directed to the management of the company and 
the person in charge of the security (unless the author is in charge of security), and in most 
cases relevant staff such as fellow security workers. In the Appendix a basic template based 
on the template made by Watson (Watson 2005) can be found.  
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8 Project Management 
 
This segment describes the importance of proper project management skills in the vulnerabil-
ity assessment. The project management process itself varies extensively depending on the 
targeted facility. The project management method used in this thesis is gathered from the 
book "Strategic Security Management" by Karim H. Vellani (2007). The reason for choosing this 
method is the to the simplicity and effectiveness.  
 
A vulnerability assessment is a time consuming project that depending on the extent and re-
sources can take anything from a couple of hours, to days or weeks. To help the designated 
individual conducting the vulnerability assessment the process should be done as a project. If 
project management is googled the number of hits exceeds 300 million. To be able to find the 
most appropriate methodology can be very time consuming and therefore in this thesis the 
project management methodology comes from "Strategic Security Management" by Karim H. 
Vellani (2007, 251-263). 
 
The reason for choosing his methodology over other tools or software is due to the simplicity 
and the adaptability of the methodology, and due to the fact that the person doing the vul-
nerability assessment does not need any equipment that would cost money. If the person 
conducting the vulnerability assessment is used to a specific project management tool or 
methodology can and most likely should continue with that approach. In this chapter the pro-
ject management methodology comes from the book Strategic security management that was 
mentioned above.  
 
To reach successful completion in a project there are three central components that need to 
be fulfilled. The first one is the scope, second is time, and the third is the costs. These main 
subjects can and most likely will be further defined depending on the size of the project.  
Each project is, as stated above, unique and therefore it should be treated as such. 
 
The primarily reasons for using this method are because of the simplicity, clear assignments, 
ease of beginning and not requiring any special software or tools. The appropriate project 
management method, if one is required, is up to the reader and their knowledge regarding 
different project management tools. There are project management tools that do not cost 
anything such as GanttProject, Open Workbench, jxProject, in addition to software and sites 
that can provide the necessary tools/software for the person undertaking this project. Pro-
ject Management Institute is one of many examples of a site where a person with no 
knowledge regarding project management can sign up, undertake webinars regarding project 
management and get help to create a template for the vulnerability assessment project. 
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8.1 Development 
 
The main tasks that need to be done within the development section are defining what the 
project is about (scope statement), constructing concrete goals and objectives, coming up 
with a strategy, trying to locate the risks, constructing a project charter and identifying the 
stakeholders in the project. Sometimes the project needs to follow regulations/laws, internal 
requirements, etc. and therefore the definition of the project might grow.   
 
In the Vulnerability Assessment project, the development stage is a crucial stage because it 
sets the tone of how extensive the project will be. If the development part is written in a 
general and vague form, the project can be never-ending. If possible, the auditor should go 
through any old vulnerability assessment analysis done within the company or other rele-
vant/similar facilities to understand the best strategy to undergo this project with the re-
sources given and the knowledge and manpower available.   
 
8.2 Planning process 
 
“Depending on the nature of the project, planning, may be an extensive, time-consuming 
process or it may be a simple, streamlined process” (Vellani 2007, 252). The most important 
part in the planning process is to write down the summary tasks and individual tasks require-
ments. Summary tasks are the general tasks that the project consists off, and the individual 
tasks are the tasks within every summary task that must be done before that section can be 
closed. Sometimes several summary tasks can be initiated at the same time and others need 
to wait until another summary task is completed. 
 
In the planning phase, the Project Manager has an important role to make sure the necessary 
resources and equipment are at hand for their team members. They also need to be support-
ive of the Project Management members.  
 
8.3 Execution phase  
 
The execution phase of the project is the most time consuming part of the whole project. In 
this phase each individual that belongs to the project starts to collect the relevant raw data, 
and update other members of their process. Depending on the nature or construction of the 
project, the individuals might have physical or non-physical meetings to present their status, 
findings, problems or advancements.  
 
Each Summary task (deliverables) has individual tasks. For example, the facility documenta-
tion summary tasks consists of documenting the physical conditions, the facility daily and 
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none daily operations, policies and procedures, regulatory requirements, goals and objectives 
of the company etc. One of the most important factors in the project management is the con-
trol structure where the project manager can make sure that each individual is doing the as-
signed tasks and on time, otherwise the project might be delayed.  
 
8.4 Conclusion phase 
 
The conclusion phase is the phase where everything is put together, and a report is generat-
ed. Depending on the size of the project and the audience the report is intended to, the ex-
tent of the report varies. The conclusion phase ensures that the scope and the objectives of 
the security project have been met, quality of the work performed, and that all required 
documentation has been completed.  
 
The significant sections regarding project management and vulnerability assessment is that in 
the conclusion phase each segment investigated is analyzed and the project management 
group needs to analyze if the budget was on target, otherwise future changes might be re-
quired, if the work was done in the time given otherwise future scheduled work might need 
an adjustment, the end result of each segment and if it is in a satisfactory level. 
 
9 Conclusion 
 
This thesis contains guidelines regarding project management, facility categorization, asset 
identification, threat identification, auditing, red teaming and the manager report. 
 
The project management chapter describes the general process of how a vulnerability as-
sessment can be done. I tried to identify the critical parts of the project and make sure the 
reader understands the basics. There are numerous project management tools and the person 
conducting the Vulnerability assessment needs to take several critical aspects such as time 
frame, level of knowledge, resources, experience, level of assessment and more into consid-
eration before the project is started. 
 
The facility categorization chapter describes the general process of the common knowledge 
regarding the facility that is necessary to know before anything else is done. Many vulnerabil-
ity assessment teams tend to forget to analyze aspects such as the surroundings, terrain, 
neighboring companies, population density and more. 
 
The third part is about the asset identification. Several security organizations and vulnerabil-
ity assessments tend to start with the threat analysis and then the asset identification. In the 
majority of the cases the vulnerability assessment team conducts the assessment on a fully 
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operational facility and therefore at this point the different assets have fixed places, and it is 
necessary to analyze where they are before going into the threat analysis. To be able to un-
derstand how the adversary thinks and acts you need to understand what they are after.  
 
The fourth part is about the threat assessment, which means that the vulnerability assess-
ment team starts to analyze the adversaries they think could act against their facility. There 
are numerous threats that could be taken into consideration, but by first categorizing the fa-
cility and identifying the assets, the vulnerability assessment team can leave out or prioritize 
the most up to date threats against the given facility.  
 
The vulnerability assessment team needs to understand that a threat analysis is one of the 
most dynamic chapters in the vulnerability assessment if we think about how rapidly it can 
change.  
 
The fifth part is the auditing that the vulnerability assessment team conducts on the facility 
and staff itself. The audit can be divided into the project itself, and some parts can be done 
in the beginning during the categorization and by allowing the facility staff to fill in the in-
formation, while other parts of the auditing needs to be done by the vulnerability assessment 
team themselves. The most important part here is to understand the threats against the facil-
ity and to conduct the central part of the audit with that in mind. 
  
The sixth part of the vulnerability assessment is the red teaming. Red teaming means in gen-
eral that the vulnerability assessment team conducts different tests to see how, for instance, 
the general staff and/or security staff reacts to different problems or situations. Some organ-
izations use this tool very often to keep their staff up to date and alert.  
 
Part seven, last part, is the vulnerability assessment report itself. Depending on the vulnera-
bility assessment team and their work, the gathered amount of information can be huge and 
serve as a vital component for further security development, but the vulnerability assessment 
report is a report for the management. The management does not need to know every detail 
about the assessment, but they do need to know the relevant aspects.  
 
My findings are that this thesis is a very basic tool for future security managers, but it is a 
good starting point to continue further development in aspects of vulnerability assessment. 
Majority of security companies today want to sell their products at the highest price and care 
very little about the actual threats and/or the deeper assessment that needs to be done so 
the proper equipment, and in some cases cheaper and more efficient equipment, can be 
bought and installed.  
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The amount of knowledge that has been written regarding vulnerability assessment is huge 
and therefore the first limitation of this bachelor's thesis is the lack of complete coverage of 
all the written material. The first and most important aspect is that the companies that con-
duct vulnerability assessments are reluctant to share their methods because it actually means 
that a potential adversary can understand how the security is constructed.  
 
The second limitation of this thesis is the vast and diverse information regarding how a vul-
nerability assessment should be done. There is no correct and simple method and the most 
important factor the vulnerability assessment team should rely on is their knowledge and ex-
perience.  
 
The dynamic world we live in is the third limitation to this Vulnerability assessment. Our ad-
versaries develop new methods to achieve their end goals and therefore a standard or method 
set today might be obsolete very quickly.  
 
Due to the fact that vulnerability assessment is something that I personally am very interest-
ed in, I will continue to work on my own templates and update them with the latest infor-
mation I can receive. Hopefully one day I will have enough knowledge to put everything in a 
computer based program so a more accurate calculation and assessment can be conducted.  
 
 
Illustration 1 Vulnerability Assessment process summary 
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 Appendix 1 
The following books from ASIS PSP reference material were used: 
Title Short description 
Design and Evaluation of Physical protection 
systems, 2nd Ed. 
This book is in my opinion the most compre-
hensive book available regarding specific are-
as that a Vulnerability Assessment needs to 
have. It covers everything from facility char-
acterization to Threat analysis. 
Risk analysis and the security survey, 4th ed. This book is in my opinion a good start for 
any security manager that would like to have 
basic knowledge regarding risk analysis and 
security surveys 
PSP Reference, 2nd Ed This book was mostly used for the theoretical 
information needed for the asset protection. 
General Security Risk Assessment This publication was used as a reference on 
how the vulnerability assessment outline 
needs to be constructed.  
Appendix 1 ASIS PSP reference books used for this thesis 
 
The following books/publications were used from Sandia National Laboratories: 
Title Short description 
Sandia Report – Categorizing threat The Sandia report assisted me with a funda-
mental framework regarding assessing a 
threat, and how to categorize it. 
Sandia Report – The IDART methodology This methodology gathered from Sandia re-
port was partly used for the Red Teaming 
section. 
Sandia Report – Security Assessment Report The methodology used in this publication was 
the central point of the Vulnerability assess-
ment chapter in the end of this thesis. 
Sandia Report - A Risk Assessment Methodolo-
gy (RAM) for Physical security 
The methodology and risk calculation was 
part of the risk assessment, asset identifica-
tion and general methodology used in this 
thesis. 
Appendix 2 Sandia National Laboratories books/publication used for this thesis 
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 Appendix 1 
The following books/publications were used from other sources: 
Title Short description 
Anti-Terrorism: Criteria, Tools & Technology A general understanding regarding docu-
mented threats, tools, and criteria was ex-
tracted from this publication. 
A Vulnerability Assessment Methodology for 
Critical Infrastructure Facilities 
This publication was used as a reference 
point for the vulnerability assessment con-
tent and methodology. 
University of Foreign Military and Cultural 
Studies – Red Team Handbook 
This handbook was part of the red teaming 
summary in this thesis.  
Ministry of Defense – Red Teaming guide This manual was part of the red teaming 
summary in this thesis 
A tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic 
Techniques for improving intelligence analy-
sis 
These guidelines helped me with the assess-
ment of the material for this vulnerability 
assessment thesis, and it was also used for 
the red teaming chapter. 
Strategic Security Management – A Risk As-
sessment guide for decision makers 
This book was mainly used for the threat as-
sessment, crime analysis, Asset identifica-
tion, and risk assessment chapters.  
FEMA 452 – Risk Assessment FEMA 452 helped me structure this thesis re-
garding identifying critical assets, fundamen-
tal methodology for a vulnerability assess-
ment, and how to access risks 
FEMA 455 – Handbook for visual screening of 
buildings to evaluate terrorism risks 
FEMA 455 helped me understand and struc-
ture up a fundamental methodology for 
screening a facility.  
Appendix 3 Additional books/publication used for this thesis 
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 Appendix 1 
Security Analysis 
 
 
 
Name of the company: _____________________________________________________________ 
Country / City: ___________________________________________________________________ 
Address of the company: ___________________________________________________________ 
Person conducting the analysis: _____________________________________________________ 
Position of the analyst: ____________________________________________________________ 
Contact details of the analyst:  _____________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Additional notes from the analyst regarding the confidentiality or the company 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Appendix 4 Security analysis cover page 
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 Appendix 1 
Security Analysis 
Facility characterization 
(1/3) 
 
 
Type of building (e.g. hospital): 
_____________________________________________________ 
Owner of the building: ____________________________________________________________ 
Companies in the facility: _________________________________________________________ 
Regarding authorities: -­‐ Driving instructions to the closest police station: -­‐ Driving instructions to the closest hospital: -­‐ Emergency contacts to the closets police/hospital: -­‐ Estimated response time for the police: -­‐ Estimated response time for the ambulance: -­‐ Estimated response time for the fire brigade 
Connected buildings: _____________________________________________________________ 
Building mode:  
Employees during the working hours: ______________________________________________ 
Predetermined security level: _____________________________________________________ 
Has a surrounding / topography picture been extracted:  -­‐ Is the facility clearly marked in the picture? -­‐ Have security zones been clearly marked in the picture? -­‐ Have surrounding areas/facility been clearly marked? 
Have the following blueprints been extracted: -­‐ Blueprints of the floors: -­‐ Blueprints of the electricity: -­‐ Blueprints of the plumbing: -­‐ Blueprints of existing security installations: -­‐ Blueprints of ventilation routes: -­‐ Blueprints of emergency routes: 
 
Appendix 5 Facility Characterization 
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 Appendix 1 
Security Analysis 
Facility characterization 
(2/3) 
 
Information regarding perimeter installations/Vulnerabilities 
Information regarding Perimeter Fence 
Type L M H N/A Comment 
Perimeter 
Fence 
     
L = Lack of 
fence 
     
M = Fence ex-
ists but only 
part of the area 
is sealed off 
     
H = Fence ex-
ists and pro-
vides security 
against e.g. 
intruders 
     
Type of fence?      
Type of locking 
mechanism? 
     
Clear area on 
both sides of the 
fence? 
     
Estimated time to 
penetrate? 
     
Vulnerable ac-
cording to threat 
assessment? 
     
Security installa-
tions? 
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Information regarding perimeter lighting 
Type L M H N/A Comment 
Perimeter 
lighting 
     
L = Lack of 
lighting 
     
M = Partial 
lighting of the 
perimeter area 
     
H = Perimeter 
lighting exists 
and covers all 
the surrounding 
areas  
     
Is the lighting 
working with 
other means of 
security? 
     
Is the lighting 
constant or by 
movement? 
     
Estimated time of 
effectiveness? 
     
Vulnerable ac-
cording to threat 
assessment? 
     
Security installa-
tions? 
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Security Analysis 
Facility characterization 
(3/3) 
 
Information regarding outer doors 
Type L M H N/A Comment 
Outer door      
L = Door made 
of low security 
material 
     
M = Partially 
secure door 
     
H = Security 
door  
     
Type of door 
material? 
     
Frame around the 
door is secure? 
     
Estimated time of 
effectiveness? 
     
Vulnerable ac-
cording to threat 
assessment? 
     
Security installa-
tions? 
     
 
Information regarding other openings 
Type L M H N/A Comment 
Other open-
ing 
     
Type of opening?      
Opening made of?      
Secure frame?      
Estimated time of 
effectiveness? 
     
Vulnerable ac-
cording to threat 
assessment? 
     
Security installa-
tions? 
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Security Analysis 
Measures – CCTV-system 
(1/1) 
 
General Information regarding the CCTV-system 
CCTV-system bought from: _________________________________________________________ 
CCTV-system installation year: 
________________________________________________________ 
CCTV-system installed by: __________________________________________________________ 
CCTV-system brand: _______________________________________________________________ 
CCTV-system type of recorder: ______________________________________________________ 
 
Information regarding the recorder -­‐ A manual exists (format):                                                                   Yes   No                -­‐ Information regarding hardware components exists:                          Yes   No                -­‐ Information regarding password / access ID exists:                            Yes   No                -­‐ Information regarding configuration exists:                                       Yes   No         -­‐ Operating system software backup exists:                                         Yes   No                
 
Information regarding the cameras -­‐ Types of cameras are installed (IP/BNC/Wireless/etc.): 
_________________________________ -­‐ Resolution: 
___________________________________________________________________
___________ -­‐ Software program exists:                                                                 Yes   No                -­‐ Installation manual exists:                                                               Yes   No                -­‐ Information regarding password / access ID exists:                            Yes   No                -­‐ Amount of fixed cameras and where (marked on overview picture):            Yes   No                -­‐ Amount of movable cameras and where (picture):                              Yes   No                -­‐ Outside cameras are weatherproof protected:                                  Yes   No                -­‐ Outside cameras are vandalism protected:                                       Yes   No               -­‐ Outside cameras are protected against animals:                                Yes   No                -­‐ Inside camera are vandalism protected:                                            Yes   No                -­‐ Cables between cameras and recorder are protected:                      Yes   No                
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Security Analysis 
Measures – Keys & Locks 
(1/1) 
 
General Information regarding the Key-system 
Key-system bought from: ___________________________________________________________ 
Key-system installation year: 
_________________________________________________________ 
Key-system installed by: ___________________________________________________________ 
Key-system brand: ________________________________________________________________ 
CCTV-system type of recorder: ______________________________________________________ 
 
Information regarding the Key-system -­‐ Total amount of exterior door keys issued: 
___________________________________________ -­‐ Total amount of interior door keys issued: 
___________________________________________ -­‐ Total amount of master keys: 
___________________________________________ -­‐ Proper filled-in key log: 
 ___________________________________________ -­‐ Who will be informed if a key is lost: 
___________________________________________ -­‐ If an outside key is lost, will the locks/keys be changed: 
___________________________________________ -­‐ If an outside key is not returned, will the locks/keys be changed: 
___________________________________________ -­‐ Are spare keys stored in a secure location:                                        Yes   No                -­‐ Do sensitive areas have specific keys:                                                Yes   No                -­‐ Does the local police/rescue department have a key:                        Yes   No                
 
Information regarding the Lock-system 
Type L M H N/A Comment 
Lock system 
Outside 
doors 
     
L = Basic lock 
with no security 
     
M = Medium 
security lock 
     
H = Lock with 
high security  
     
Name of the lock 
system 
     
Frame & installa-
tion regarding the 
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lock is secure? 
Estimated time of 
effectiveness? 
     
Vulnerable ac-
cording to threat 
assessment? 
     
Security      
 
Appendix 6 Measures keys and locks 
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Security Analysis 
Access Control 
 
General Information regarding the Access control system 
Type L M H N/A Comment 
Access con-
trol system 
     
L = No security 
check of any-
one 
     
M = Partial 
security check 
(Employees vs. 
visitors vs etc) 
     
H = Everyone 
who access the 
facility is 
checked  
     
Is the access 
check done at the 
perimeter? 
     
Do security guards 
do the access 
control? 
     
Is the Access 
control done from 
a protected area? 
     
Vulnerable ac-
cording to threat 
assessment? 
     
Security installa-
tions? 
     
Are deliveries 
checked and 
verified? 
     
Is the post securi-
ty checked? 
     
Are badges given 
to visitors? 
     
Can the security 
installations  
     
 
Additional information regarding the Access control system: 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Appendix 7 Access control 
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Security Analysis 
Alarm system 
 
General Information regarding the Alarm-system 
Alarm-system bought from: _________________________________________________________ 
Alarm-system installation year: 
________________________________________________________ 
Alarm-system installed by: _________________________________________________________ 
Alarm-system brand: ______________________________________________________________ 
Alarm-system sensors: _____________________________________________________________ 
Alarm-system type of transmitter: ___________________________________________________ 
 
Type L M H N/A Comment 
Alarm system      
L = No alarm sys-
tem / Not working 
     
M = Alarm system 
exists but only 
internally con-
nected 
 
     
H = Alarm system 
exists and is con-
nected to 
e.g.police, securi-
ty (own/outside) 
(panic buttons)  
     
Is the alarm sys-
tem systematical-
ly checked (annu-
ally/yearly)? 
     
Is the system 
tamper/vandalism 
proof? 
     
Is the alarm sys-
tem sensitive to 
the weather? 
     
How are alarms 
verified? 
     
Is the alarm sys-
tem connected 
with other sys-
tems (CCTV) 
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Vulnerable ac-
cording to threat 
assessment? 
     
Where are the 
alarm sensors 
installed? 
     
Is there any ar-
ea/s that is not 
covered with a 
sensor? 
     
 
Additional information regarding the Alarm system: 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Appendix 8 Alarm system 
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Security Analysis 
Floor information 
 
 
Floor no: ________________________________________________________________________ 
Following information have been extracted and inserted in the designated floor info ap-
pendix: -­‐ Floor plan                                                                                       Yes   No                -­‐ Overview pictures of the floor                                                         Yes   No                -­‐ Pictures of each room                                                                     Yes   No                -­‐ Pictures of the windows                                                                  Yes   No                -­‐ Pictures of vulnerabilities (soft spots):                                            Yes   No                -­‐ Information regarding the walls:                                                     Yes   No                
- Thickness: 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
- Made off: 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
- Security/Blast/bullet proof resistance information: 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Information regarding the windows 
- Thickness: 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
- Film: 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
- Security/Black/bullet proof grade information: 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
- Distance between the window and the outside ground level (reachable): 
_________________________________________________________________________ -­‐ Asset information 
- Floor overview sheet with assets clearly marked: 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
- Security installation around the asset: 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Appendix 9 Floor information 
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Security Analysis 
Security Policy 
 
General Information regarding the security policy (SOP) 
SOP was constructed by: ___________________________________________________________ 
SOP was reviewed last time by: _____________________________________________________ 
SOP is approved by the legal department: ____________________________________________ 
SOP is approved by the management: ________________________________________________ 
SOP is in written / verbal form given to e.g. security staff: __________________________ 
SOP is in written / verbal form given to all employees: ____________________________ 
SOP is read annually / periodically by security staff: _________________________________ 
 
 
Does the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) contain information regarding the fol-
lowing topics 
 
 
Theft of property Burglary 
Assault Bomb threats 
Arson Civil disturbance 
Terrorists  General criminals 
Extremists Foreign intelligence personnel 
Psychotics Insiders 
 
Additional information inserted in the SOP 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
Appendix 10 Security Policy 
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Type of Adversary 
 
Objective 
 
For example theft, 
sabotage, insider, 
fraud, extortion 
  
Information 
 
H M L Score 
Existence, Intention & 
Access to region 
 
The adversary clear-
ly exists in the re-
gion, clear intention 
of attacking the 
facility and exists in 
the region 
The adversary exists 
in the area or sur-
roundings, low or 
none intention of 
attacking the facili-
ty but do exists in 
the region 
The adversary has 
very low presence in 
the area, low inten-
tion of attacking and 
non/limited access 
to the region. 
 
Material resources 
 
The adversary has 
enough material 
resources to conduct 
the attack 
The adversary has 
some material re-
sources but limited 
to fulfill a full pene-
tration 
The adversary has 
no material re-
sources to conduct 
the attack 
 
Technical skills 
 
The adversary has 
technical resources 
to conduct the at-
tack 
The adversary has 
some technical skills 
to fulfill the attack 
The adversary has 
no technical skills to 
conduct the attack 
 
Planning/organizational 
skills 
 
The adversary has 
enough knowledge, 
time and organiza-
tional skills to con-
duct the attack 
The adversary has 
some knowledge, 
time and organiza-
tional skills to con-
duct the attack 
The adversary has 
limited knowledge, 
time or organiza-
tional skills to con-
duct the attack 
 
Financial resources 
 
The adversary has 
enough financial 
resources to conduct 
the attack 
The adversary has 
some financial re-
sources but limited 
to fulfill a full pene-
tration 
The adversary has 
limited financial 
resources to conduct 
the attack 
 
Stealth The adversary can 
remain hidden under 
a long period of 
time 
The adversary can 
for a limited period 
remain hidden 
The adversary can-
not remain hidden 
and will be in the 
process spotted 
 
Corporation with a  
Insider  
The adversary needs 
the help of an insid-
er or is an insider 
(active help) 
The adversary needs 
some information to 
fulfill the attack 
(passive help) 
The adversary needs 
no help from an 
insider to fulfill the 
attack 
 
Amount of attackers The adversary needs 
to be minimum of 
XX 
The adversary needs 
to be minimum of 
XX 
The adversary needs 
to be minimum of 
XX 
 
Appendix 11 Information needed for Threat spectrum 
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Type of Adversary 
 
Objective 
 
For example theft, 
sabotage, insider, 
fraud, extortion 
  
Information 
 
H M L Score 
Past interest 
 
The adversary has 
shown a clear inter-
est in attacking the 
given facility or 
similar facilities 
The adversary has 
shown some interest 
in the facility or 
similar attacks has 
been executed on 
similar facilities 
The adversary has 
not shown any in-
terest of attacking 
the building, and no 
documented inci-
dents exists on simi-
lar facilities 
 
Past attacks 
 
The adversary has 
attacked the facility 
or attacked similar 
facilities 
The adversary has 
attempted to attack 
the facility or at-
tempted to attack 
similar facilities 
The adversary has 
not attacked the 
facility or any other 
similar facility 
 
Current interest 
 
The adversary has 
shown clear inten-
tion of attacking the 
facility 
The adversary has 
shown limited inter-
est of attacking the 
building 
The adversary has 
not shown any in-
terest in attacking 
the building 
 
Current surveillance 
 
The adversary has 
been monitoring the 
facility and/or simi-
lar facilities and/or 
monitoring the area 
The adversary has 
during limited time 
monitored the facili-
ty and/or similar 
facilities and/or 
monitoring the area 
The adversary has 
not been keeping 
any kind of surveil-
lance of the building 
 
Documented threats 
 
The adversary had 
either been there 
before, threatened 
and/or against simi-
lar facilities 
The adversary has to 
a limited extent 
threatened the giv-
en facility or similar 
facilities 
The adversary has 
not shown any in-
terest of the facility 
 
Motivation 
(Ideological, economic, 
personal)  
The adversary is 
extremely motivated 
to conduct the at-
tack  
The adversary Is to 
motivated to con-
duct the attack 
The adversary is not 
motivated to con-
duct the attack 
 
Appendix 12 History of the adversary 
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Type of Adversary 
 
Objective 
 
For example theft, 
sabotage, insider, 
fraud, extortion 
  
Attractiveness 
 
H M L Score 
Desired level of conse-
quence 
 
The adversary is 
aiming for high level 
of fatality and/or 
economic loss 
The adversary is aim-
ing for limited or 
none casualty level 
and/or limited eco-
nomic loss 
The adversary is not 
aiming for media 
publicity or making 
a statement or aim-
ing for a specific 
target 
 
Ideology 
 
The adversary’s 
ideology is on an 
extremist level and 
no other viewpoints 
can interfere 
The adversary’s is 
very dedicated but 
can with proper 
tools, counter 
measures and/or 
change of environ-
ment/political cli-
mate change view-
point 
The adversary’s has 
no special ideology 
to convince him/her 
to conduct the at-
tack 
 
Ease of attack 
 
The given facility is 
easy to attack and 
has no proper physi-
cal security and/or 
guard force 
The given facility has 
limited physical secu-
rity and/or limited 
guard force 
The given facility 
has strong physical 
security, security 
force with appropri-
ate equipment and 
connection to the 
local authority 
 
Appendix 13 Attractivenes against the facility in the eyes of the adversary 
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Vulnerability Assessment Report 
For the management 
 
Executive summary 
In the executive summary the author of the report needs to give a shortened introduction 
of the assignment, information about the authors, mission statement, findings of the vul-
nerability assessment in terms of weaknesses (amount depends on the findings), short ex-
planation why these weaknesses are prioritized, recommendations and general budget if 
the recommendations are approved. 
 
Introduction 
The introduction needs to contain a more in depth explanation of the mission (background 
information). In aspects of the mission, the author needs to explain the scope of the vul-
nerability assessment (extent and limitations), co-authors, staff used, description of the 
company targeted and summary of the additional information that can be found in the ap-
pendices.  
 
Laws, regulations and policies 
In this section the author needs to clarify the laws, regulations and policies that the com-
pany needs to follow. This information will give a legal justification for why some of the 
measures need to be done to achieve the approval from the legal department, but also to 
make the readers understand that certain methods/rules/laws needs to be followed, oth-
erwise there might be legal and financial consequences.  
 
Facility characterization 
The facility characterization needs to contain all the relevant information that was in the 
scope. The more information that can be gathered and inserted in this section will only 
benefit the author and the desired outcome. Once the material is gathered it can be edited 
and upgraded with pictures and even videos.  
 
Asset identification 
The asset identification needs to contain all the relevant information about the assets in 
assigned scope. The order of the assets can be divided in the groups mentioned in the asset 
identification chapter (tangible and intangible).  
 
The important factor here is to rank the assets in priorities according to the intention of 
the company, importance, economical value and long and short-term value. The assets 
should also be analyzed through their attractiveness for the adversary. 
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Threat assessment 
The threat assessment section is based on the threat assessment that can be found in the 
appendices (as an example). This section might be extensive and therefore the author 
needs to make sure that he/she understands that all threats cannot be taken into consider-
ation. The most relevant threats against the company should be inserted in this section.  
 
Auditing  
The auditing section is based on the auditing documents found in the appendices (as an ex-
ample). The readers need to understand the scope of the audit, process of the audit, sec-
tions audited, questions/procedures of the audit and in the end of the report in the appen-
dices the questions and discoveries should be inserted.  
 
Red teaming 
If red teaming is used the scope of the red teaming needs to be explained, the mission of 
the red team, method used, findings, recommendations and reasons for the recommenda-
tions.  
 
Summary 
The summary should contain a short summary of the topics mentioned above, but also the 
suggested budget and timeframe of the suggested alternations. The extent of the summary 
depends on the findings and the scope. 
 
Appendix 14 Vulnerability assessment report template 
